

INTERNATIONAL/DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN DISASTER ASSISTANCE: MESSAGES AND GOODS*

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INTRODUCTION

Increasing interest in international disaster assistance is testified to by the creation of an Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in 1964 and an Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) in 1972, by meetings and reports of a UNA-USA Policy Studies Panel on International Disaster Assistance (1977) and a Committee on International Disaster Assistance (CIDA) of the National Research Council (1978a, 1978b), and by well-attended conferences like that on Disasters and the Small Dwelling held at Oxford Polytechnic in April 1978. Scholarly and professional writing on the subject is becoming more readily available – see, for example, the selective bibliographies in CIDA (1978b) – and two specialized journals, *Mass Emergencies* and *Disasters*, are largely devoted to the theme. The present article grows out of this multi-disciplinary, cross-national matrix of activity and thought. Much of what it says resembles the received folk-wisdom of the field. But here and there

a somewhat different point of view is introduced.

Indeed, the term “international disaster assistance” is a bit of a misnomer, for the phenomenon in question is also profoundly domestic. The by now familiar assertion that the government of the country where a disaster occurs bears the (or a) primary responsibility for alleviating its consequences reflects this fact. It will simply be taken as given that “international disaster assistance” refers to an international-cum-domestic process.

Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate this is through areas representing the international scheme of things (*I*), the domestic scheme of things (*D*), and the “cum” which we will label *T* (see Fig. 1). Vague phrasing like “scheme of things” is being used so as to avoid implicit judgments about the extent of integration and mutuality obtaining: a word like “system” would have virtually settled the issue by fiat [1]. The intermediary term is labelled *T*, since it involves a transformation mechanism whereby domestic things are internationalized and international things are domesticized.




Fig. 1

*The first draft of this paper was prepared while I was a visiting research associate at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. At that time I was also on sabbatical leave from the University of Illinois and recipient of a fellowship from the Institute for the Study of World Politics.

The “things” referred to can be categorized in various ways. Here it may suffice to separate messages on the one hand from material items (goods, services, personnel) on the other. The distinction is not entirely watertight. Manifests, which accompany goods, are messages; and they are also material in nature, as anyone running out of file space can testify. But generally analysts and actors have little hesitancy about assigning things to one category or the other.

Messages are discussed first. The subsequent consideration of material items is briefer. The emphasis throughout both sections is on transformations. Both discussions begin in a highly simplified way, with complications only gradually added.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MESSAGES

For international disaster assistance, this function can be structured in many ways. One much talked about and advocated of late involves regular, habitualized communications, in both directions, between a uniquely designated disaster relief body within the affected country and a uniquely designated relief body (UNDRO is often mentioned) outside that country (Green, 1977). Such streamlining and exclusivity of channels supposedly enhance the likelihood of successful communications when disaster strikes.

From an international relations perspective, this is a familiar, even hackneyed model. Forget that disaster agencies are involved and instead generalize to a specifically authorized body within a country that has sole control over official communications passing across that country’s boundaries and that communicates just with analogous authorized bodies in the outside world. One has here the standard international relations paradigm, with such communications being the responsibility of foreign offices. It is the links between *them* that comprise the links between nation-states [2].

Few theoreticians of international relations today would be at ease with so austere a doctrine. Not only may heads of governments or their special advisers eclipse “state department” operations and military leaders emit direct signals, but also officials in various subject specialties – agriculture, finance, technology, labor – may be in frequent, sometimes institutionalized, touch with their opposite numbers elsewhere. Some observers go even further and underline the proliferation of contacts across boundaries in which governments play little or no direct part at all. These include various privately sponsored person-to-person programs, a worldwide “invisible college,” meetings of experts from of a number of countries, multi-national corporations practicing a kind of limited private diplomacy, and international federations of all sorts (e.g. Angell, 1969).

Those who propose the linkage of two disaster relief focal points, one inside and one outside the affected country, do not deny that there is much more to governments and politics than just this. They know that in any country there is a cacophony of governmental officials distinguishable by subject matter competence, placement within a national, state, or local network, ideology, ethnic group, and so on. They also know that there is considerable heterogeneity in the non-domestic world and that the UN, itself a diverse body, is seldom a powerful international actor. But they expect that after a disaster occurs all messages from within a country are passed upon in a consistent manner by a singular domestic disaster agency; and similarly at the international level. Such expectations are almost sure to be unfulfilled. The inability of foreign offices to retain a monopoly on interstate diplomacy presages a similar inability of disaster offices to confine messages within their channels, whether these offices are styled focal points or not.

Another elegant way of handling the message transformation process involves the cre-

ation of a body — one for each country — which would contain representatives of both the domestic scene and the world outside. Membership from the host government need not be confined to those in a disaster relief agency but may include persons in the military or in such departments as health, agriculture, and transportation. Domestic non-governmental representation is also likely in many instances. So too, membership from the international sphere may go beyond UN Resident Representatives, as the eyes and ears of UNDRO, or other UN organizations, and extend to regional agencies, administrators from other countries, e.g., personnel from the AID-mission or US Embassy, and so on. (Persons from local private organizations that have international affiliates, like the Red Cross and the churches, may be considered ambiguously international/domestic.)

Theoretically, a mixed local-foreign, governmental-private disaster relief coordination body could be instituted in advance, and independently, of any particular disasters. Interaction among its members will thereby constitute a routinized network of communications to be relied upon when an actual disaster occurs. (This statement has to be modified according to whether one conceives of membership in terms of particular persons or of the holders of particular roles; cf. Davis and Weinbaum, 1969). In practice, the body is likely to have a considerable ad hoc, case-specific component, depending for example on the magnitude and kind of the disaster. Warfare will see some agencies dropping out and perhaps others, like the ICRC, that are not otherwise relevant, becoming prominent. The response to protracted famines may well require different skills and resources than an earthquake or flood. Even so, many components of the coordinating body should remain the same, so that it retains a noteworthy regular aspect as well.

A chief virtue of the domestic/international focal points linkage described earlier or of the mixed coordination body is that it reduces

the chances of a communications overload upon the affected government or its disaster agency. This assertion needs qualification. Under the first plan, message flows from within the country to the domestic focus are not diminished and may well be vastly augmented; and similarly for in-country messages emanating from the focus. The chief gain involves the transmission of information across the border. There the domestic focal point needs to speak and listen only to its external opposite member, and this of course is a major simplification. The situation of the international focal point (whether it be something like UNDRO or like ICVA or like AID/OFDA) would, loosely speaking, be the mirror image of its domestic counterpart.

The advantages of the mixed body in this respect are greater. In-country observers can use customary channels to pass along information to their headquarters; and these in turn would either be directly represented in the mixed body or stand a reasonable chance of having habitual working relations with such a group — for instance, one Protestant organization with another. Not everything need go in the first instance through the disaster relief agency; and certainly not just through it. Second, the mixed body is likely to become a negotiating forum both for action recommendations and for the assessment and enhancement of information quality. Third, messages destined for the outside world can proceed not only from the disaster agency but also from those members who have habituated contacts abroad — for example, the local Red Cross with LICROSS or Catholic agencies with CRS in Geneva or the ResRep with UNDRO or the AID mission with Washington headquarters — and similarly for messages inward [3]. The national disaster agency does not have to manage the entire communications process itself, either domestically or cross-border, and at the same time the chances of messages getting through are magnified. Yet all is not redundancy, unapplied enthusi-

asm, and confusion, since the regular meetings of the mixed body permit detailed exchanges of data and the imposition of counter-checks.

The mixed domestic/international body is, in its implications, not just a telescoping of the domestic/international focal points linkage. Its make-up is more diversified and perhaps more pluralistic. It involves face-to-face meetings, with the social-psychological connotations of that medium in preference to air-waves. In particular, the opportunities for discussion, the necessity for give-and-take, question and answer, shifting of emphases, and (sometimes) off-the-record informality enhance the potential for bargaining, compromise, or at least the specification of differences. It also involves people, all (or most) of whom have both intimate knowledge of the particular country undergoing the disaster and considerable field experience. (On the advantages of that, see Taylor (1978), among others.)

It would, of course, be quixotic to expect that a mixed body can monopolize communications any more successfully than would a foci linkage. Nor is it obviously desirable that it have this capacity. Moreover, as monitoring techniques advance, in-country exclusive management of disaster-related news and needs lessens anyway. Even now, seismographic readings, combined with vulnerability analyses, allow outsiders to make *prima facie* estimates of the earthquake situation to be encountered. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance will extend this capability to many other types of disasters, including impending famines (Ad Hoc Committee on Remote Sensing for Development, 1977, especially Table 4). Culture-and-personality studies generated by anthropologists and others can also help narrow the range of probabilities [4]. All these techniques involve the activation of regular communications channels that lie, in the first instance, almost entirely outside the affected country.

Other border-crossing communications may utilize regular, case-patterned, or idiosyn-

cratic channels. For example, media reporting, may be done — particularly at first — by stringers who are regularly, if sporadically, employed by the wire press. If the story warrants, some of the larger papers may assign one of their correspondents in the area to cover the unfolding events. In extreme instances media celebrities, like Mike Wallace or the most recent Winston Churchill, may make a foray into the area [5]. Another idiosyncratic, or sometimes case-patterned, way in which reports may reach the outside world involves the interception of local unauthorized broadcasts. A message that we are all starving and no food is reaching us or that the soldiers are shooting every educated civilian in a recaptured village may be monitored by Reuters or BBC or AFP and passed along to the public (Davis, 1977).

The scientific eavesdropping and the reporting just mentioned generally involves a one-way communication flow, though this is not invariable. For example, a newspaper office may wire back, seeking clarification or further information. Other commentary is typically two-way: for instance, that between representatives of overseas voluntary agencies who are, ordinarily or in this period, within the affected country and some regional or home office. In the absence of specific authorization, such communications are less likely to use radio hookups than telephone, cable, the mails, or the movement of personnel. In many cases, the faster of these public means of communication may be disrupted or overtaxed. The slower ones, admittedly, comport poorly with the informational requirements of rapid-peaking disasters; but for disasters of a more creeping kind, like famines due to crop failures and/or inadequate transportation facilities or starvation consequent upon warfare, the old-fashioned methods can bring to light just the data and the initial responses that are needed. Indeed, it is in precisely such instances that the official judgments of an in-country disaster office or even of a mixed body are

likely to prove deficient (UNA-USA Panel on International Disaster Relief, 1977).

The reasons for the deficiency, like the reasons for disaster assistance, are less important for present purposes than the blunt fact of the deficiency itself. A few general observations, however, may be in order. Countries that ignore preventive measures, including pre-planning, are more likely to fob off the implications of a disaster. Countries whose governments aspire total control within their territory and are not merely authoritarian will try to suppress disaster information, in part because they seem responsible for everything that happens. Countries with deep ethnic cleavages will downplay disasters that mainly affect areas populated by out-groups. The authorized regime of a country embroiled in a civil war will usually deny that it has any problems maintaining the population under its control, as will the rebel regime, unless its cause seems almost hopeless: to do otherwise is to admit weakness and thereby to lessen one's perceived power and supposed authority. (See, for example Green, 1977; Weinstein, 1975; Shepherd, 1975; and Davis, 1975).

Even in situations where governments put a lot of emphasis on cross-boundary communications and where many other parallel, but independent, communicative channels exist, it may be difficult to know what is going on out there and what, if any, the appropriate relief response would be. The Nigerian-Biafran War, in particular, elicited tremendous concern about intra-, inter-, and trans-national communication. Both contending regimes had ministries of information. They both retained overseas public relations consultants. Students and other nationals from both sides resided in a number of foreign countries and made their views heard. So did the governments' own embassies and special representatives' offices. There was a plethora of pressure groups, mainly but not entirely on the Biafran side. Eleemosynary agencies made many pronouncements and appeals. Foreign governments took

positions and even issued brochures defending them. Legislators in these countries discussed the issue at considerable length, formed study groups, and some visited one side or the other or both, usually with much subsequent publicity. After about a year, the war also attracted considerable media attention from the print and electronic press.

The worldwide buzz that could easily be heard during the last year-and-a-half of a two-and-a-half year war was still not enough to provide useful guidance about what relief intervention was desirable, assuming it would be permitted at all. Not until the closing weeks of the war did one even have reasonable figures on how many people were living within the Biafran enclave (Western, 1970). Estimates of gross and net death rates had been wildly divergent and, as it turned out, often grossly inflated. Statements by the contending governments, their nationals, employees, hired experts, and enthusiastic backers were always discounted heavily. The executives in government had no better information than anyone else — indeed, they depended on the official pronouncements of the regime they recognized — but at least they received some of this via secret cables. Legislators were even worse off, and mainly relied on what they read in the papers or watched on the television [6].

I once asked a British MP, quite prominent in the debates about the Nigerian-Biafran War and an acquaintance of many backers of the Biafran cause, what he considered his most important source of information about the conduct of the war. He answered with the name of an Anglo-Dutch gentleman who was manager of Madame Tussaud's Waxworks. This person, it is true, had spent a year or so in West Africa some time before — not an unusual fact, given the Dutch components in Unilever and Shell — but he would hardly have been considered an expert by most African studies centers. However, (1) he kept up with what the newspapers in Holland were

saying, (2) business trips to Amsterdam (to open a branch of the waxworks there) allowed him to meet with some Dutch doctors of tropical medicine recently returned from the area, and in particular (3) he used regularly to ring up a British woman journalist who not only read *L'Espresso* but also perused papers from the Ivory Coast, monitored Radio Kaduna via short wave, and was visited by many Biafrans passing through London. The manager of the waxworks would then pass some of her observations along to the MP. He would be listened to because he had credibility. Besides, he was a friend of a friend. (Cf. Aitken, 1971). The woman journalist, by contrast, was neither wealthy nor Christian, nor a man, and without the validation of an intermediary her information would likely not have been believed. It is upon such differences that communicative influence is sometimes built.

Lurking within this anecdotal material are familiar distinctions, like those emphasized in a Berkeley course on "Information for Decision," which

deals with the problem of converting data, considered as any bit, into information, defined as data ordered according to some scheme to aid decision. Information becomes knowledge when its use makes design and implementation of policy better rather than worse. The questions of how to convert data into information, or why information does not become knowledge, are considered in the context of organizational theory and policy analysis.

In general, what is transmitted across national borders about disasters is information and not merely data, with the exception of some automatic sensing devices. The data have already been processed, worked up, evaluated, and ordered in some fashion. The ultimate result, though, may be "un-knowledge," in that policies become "worse" (according to some method of judging better and worse); or "non-knowledge," with the available information neither consistently enhancing nor detracting from previous policy levels. In the

Nigerian-Biafran case, at least, despite all the information about the war that floated around eventually in the United States, Britain, and most of Western Europe, precious little knowledge was clearly demonstrated.

It is tempting to ascribe the latter shortage to conflicts in the substance of the information being received. One source would say one thing and another would flatly contradict it. The messages being transmitted by the Nigerian and Biafran governments, by newsmen, by religious leaders, and others, were simply not consonant, despite some noteworthy partial clusterings. There are two main rejoinders to this interpretation. First, in most disasters a heterogeneous and disparate array of information is likely to be put forward. Indeed, in all wars, it is difficult to see how, even theoretically, this could be otherwise. Second, and more crucially, it is far from certain that the receipt of information from only a single source or of only similar content would in fact readily enhance knowledge.

Certainly, reliance on single or parroting sources ensures a kind of data reliability, in somewhat the same way that voters in parliamentary systems who elect only one individual in their district are never ticket-splitters. That, however, is deductively true; it requires no confirmatory observations. Validity, by contrast, is hardly enhanced and may instead be adversely affected, for there is no way to test assertions. There are no contradictions suggesting where further investigation would be desirable. There is just an official version [7].

Most useful perhaps would be some generalization of newsmen's methods for substantiating a story. These include multiple cross-checking (incompatible, of course, with single-source models), concentration on detailed facts, skepticism toward official pronouncements, on-the-spot investigations, and attention to small inconsistencies that may be skeletal keys to larger problem areas.

Such techniques enhance the probabilities of adequate information at the top. "Knowledge," however, may still remain elusive, in part because newsmen are usually not the political decision-makers and in part because there are relevant data ranges that habitually disinterest them. Talking about relief supplies landing at a rebel airport, they would rather highlight machine gun and ack-ack fire cutting through the night sky than plumb the logistical implications of a church agency having just flown in aluminum planking for additional off-loading bays (Davis, 1972a).

The fact that reporters – or copy editors, or caption writers – frequently accentuate the negative (good news is not news just as bad poetry is not poetry) is not wholly detrimental. True, one might wish for greater balance and more attention to context in stories. Journalists also focus too much on the very earliest moments of some policy and the inevitable mistakes then, and often fail to follow through with its subsequent, regularized development. Nonetheless, the general consequences of reportage should be useful.

Let us assume that the disaster relief officials have, in the time available, assessed the physical and human damage as best they can and that – drawing upon their experience, general theoretical models, and a canvass of resources availability – they have drawn up a plan for meeting the problems. Even so, there are likely to be further difficulties from false or inadequate evaluations, from the at least partially unprecedented character of the present calamity, or from clogs and gaps in the pipelines of goods and services. A broadly conceived synoptic approach, in brief, will almost surely prove less than optimal.

Basically, there are two ways to rectify such shortcomings. One involves developing a new synoptic approach. Time constraints almost surely preclude this, though the exercise might prove helpful for the next disaster go-around. The other way involves piecemeal

rectifications of the overall schema in order to obviate the more glaring deficiencies, and probably additional changes to ease the pains that some of these rectifications in turn introduce. A priori perfection is not expected; and many problems are attended to only when and as they arise.

An old political science saying applies here: "until there is noise there is no problem." The "noise" can be made by victims or their leaders, by relief workers, or by internal assessment teams. For various reasons – victims are dislocated and may speak only local tongues, relief workers are harried and do not want to jeopardize what is being done, sophisticated assessment usually comes later if at all – other methods of amplifying noise are required. Newsmen, with their instinct for snafus and unmet crying needs, are well positioned to do this. Their stories enhance the possibilities of a successfully incremental series of responses to the disaster [8].

THE TRANSFORMATION OF GOODS AND SERVICES

Messages are intricately intertwined with the delivery of goods and services in disasters. Messages go forth from the area describing the crisis and calling in whatever detail for material responses. Messages may also pass among donor nations and organizations suggesting an allocation of responsibilities and informing one another, as well as officialdom of the country experiencing the disaster, about what is actually being done. Bills of lading, cargo manifests, and other exotica of international commerce precede or accompany the shipments. (Passports, visas, and various letters of authorization fulfill a similar role for persons in transit.) Chits of all sorts are generated by goods as they move within the domestic situation, too; and it is these, rather than the physical items themselves, that are usually analyzed by internal audits and any post audits that may be permitted.

Much more, and in greater detail, could be said along these lines. The remaining comments, however, will focus on a few aspects of the transformation of physical *rather than* message components between international and domestic. Usually this involves a one-way flow into the disaster country, though carriers, e.g., ships and planes, and personnel are constantly coming and going, and after the event, some of the bigger or more expensive pieces of equipment may also be withdrawn. The general view presented here is that, while message heterogeneity is almost surely unavoidable and may well be functional for adequate disaster response, the cross-boundary movement of goods and services is enhanced by fairly tight coordination.

There is, however, no persuasively deductive reason why the goods transformation process should be in the hands of the same organization, or array of organizations, as the message transformation process [9]. In some instances this is easy to see: for example, while newsmen report, they rarely import. But even if one is speaking of an interfocal linkage or a mixed body, the same point holds. Messages to UNDR0 do not in fact ordinarily lead to that agency assembling and shipping material or arranging medical assistance, but rather to its collating requests and passing them along. The actual designating of schedules and filling of them will in practice be in the hands of others. So too, the arrival and processing of goods or persons at the country's borders will probably remain within the hands of regular customs and immigration officials, supplemented as necessary by military troubleshooters to break up logjams. For the same reasons it is a virtual certainty that a mixed body of indigenous and international interests will farm out the obtaining and passing on of resources to agencies that are either connected to one or another of its members or are quite separate from any of them. (This is the typical way in which sub-

committees are formed.) Still, while the core entity for transforming goods and services can be distinct from the core entity for transforming messages, the two should themselves be linked by a habituated communications channel.

There is a good deal of talk these days to the effect that the disaster needs to be filled by the international community do not require an authority structure yoking together its donor components. To some degree this represents a hypostasizing of the Joint Church Aid experience during the Nigerian-Biafran War. In the main that consortium worked via telexed and in-person exchanges of information, in which each of the more important components told the others what material decisions it had taken or was about to take, and relied on seconded leadership rather than its own cadre of officials. To stop there, however, would be to misconstrue JCA's approach. It did not simply register and talk up the spontaneous reactions of its members, hoping that somehow Hegel-like absolute freedom and absolute unity would both be maximized. Instead, representatives of the major JCA members met regularly in Geneva and, while accepting gratefully what some offered to do, would specifically assign to others the provision and shipment of this or that particular commodity (Lloyd et al., 1972). Executive committee determination was reasonably conclusive. Note, too, that such structuring was felt necessary in a protracted war, where instantaneous decisions were unnecessary, and among partners all of whom shared a common Christian heritage, in Oxfam's case at one remove, and some experience in working together. How much more necessary will an authority structure, and not just a reporting system registering *laissez-faire* donations and pledges, be for an international response set of far greater heterogeneity (cf. Davis, 1976).

Such an authority structure, which (depending on what the domestic regime desires,

or, in the case of civil wars of some magnitude, what the two regimes request) could either be vivified by an UNDR0-type appointment or actually designated by the disaster-ridden country, will prevent both overshipment and under-supply of resources, the former by scheduling and prohibition, the latter by direct phased assignment. Overshipment is both easier to prevent, since it does not require that any of the components do anything, just that they avoid doing it, and yet more difficult, since many countries and agencies will simply not be stopped from their good deeds (Holt, 1977).

The dangers of overshipment, however, have frequently been exaggerated, or at least not always carefully delimited. The chief problem is not the magnitude of what is moving around within the international sphere or even what is heading toward the country in disaster. The stress point is precisely at the transformation level, and is typified by such things as port congestion and worries over spoilage and pilferage of outdated or inadequately stored merchandise. Logistical considerations argue for the early movement of stuff through the pipeline; they also argue for the flow rate to the ports of entry not exceeding the absorption capacity of the domestic infrastructure [10]. The two considerations are somewhat incompatible. What is needed is the activation of intermediary assembly and consolidation points partway along the stream. These would be far cheaper to operate than ships lying for weeks or months at anchor in the harbor; and they would also permit sorting.

The principle applies not only to high bulk items like food and blankets, where tonnage would likely lead to sea- or air-port congestion. It is also relevant to medicinals, where checking, sorting, repacking, and so on often have to be done in order to lessen the demands on harried foreign and local medical workers up-country (see, e.g., de Ville de Goyet et al., 1976). Glimmerings of the procedures ad-

vocated here are discernible in the use of off-shore island storage facilities (Fernando Po and São Tomé, neither of them Nigerian territory) by the Red Cross and the voluntary agencies before trans-shipment by night aircraft into Biafra. The simultaneous attempt to consolidate medical supplies via Copenhagen had similar implications.

One should also recognize that there may on occasion be advantages or at least no marked detriment in the supply of goods contributed exceeding the domestic needs capacity. Consider money. International over-contributing, such as to a Welsh town ravaged by a collapsed slag heap, may increase personal jealousies and societal stress; but ordinarily the results are far more favorable. For example, during the closing half-year of the Nigerian Civil War the ICRC received far higher governmental and private contributions than it was able to expend. Some of the surplus between inflow and outflow went to pay off earlier small but crucial deficits that the ICRC has run up in prior months (Davis, 1975a). The rest eventually found its way into other ICRC projects. And who is to say this is unfortunate? Indeed, agencies may go into disaster relief in order to raise money more easily for other purposes, too.

It is important not to blunt the spirit of generosity, either. During the Sahel crisis, Operation Push in Chicago raised money to purchase grain, with the proviso that the US Government underwrite the costs of shipping. The government never assented to this, and the organization in fact felt rebuffed. The wisdom of the decisions either to purchase grain or to deny a shipping subsidy will not be assessed here. Instead, the point to be emphasized is that this is one of the few recent examples of Black-American leaders being interested in ameliorating a non-domestic issue that had no direct material impact on them. In order to diminish isolationism, it might well have been advisable to underwrite the transport costs, whatever

the efficacy of that cache of food [11].

It is hardly a secret that this is a complicated world with all kinds of things going on. Whenever one undertakes a study, however, whether of a person or an event or a process, there is a tendency to see the study object by itself and to reduce most other matters to the level of possible contaminating extraneous factors. From many perspectives – for example, cybernetic or logistical – simpler and more elegant models of domestic/international transformations of messages and goods could have been developed. These models would, however, have ignored many important aspects of the real political world as it exists today, and almost surely will exist during the next few years.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. the comments on certain international communications as a quasi-system in Davis (1972b).
- 2 This resembles the state-centric model criticized by Nye and Keohane (1972).
- 3 The third set of points is recognized by Green (1977) in Figure 1 (pp. 52–53), and to a slight extent (p. 49) in his text.
- 4 A useful short list of works in this genre may be found in Almond and Verba (1963, pp. 13n–14n).
- 5 For a somewhat similar analysis see Ingram (1977).
- 6 The preceding two paragraphs derive largely from Davis (1972b).
- 7 A national organization may issue the sole “authoritative” assessment of damages, casualties, and relief requirements (Green, 1977, p. 49); but does “authoritative” necessarily imply valid as well as reliable?
- 8 Much of the terminology and reasoning in the last three paragraphs is borrowed from Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963).
- 9 Per contra, according to Green (1977, p. 49), “UNDRO should serve as a disaster relief traffic policeman, controlling the flow of information, supplies, and equipment.”
- 10 The latter theme is stressed in the report by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1970). But the report also provides data on the former.
- 11 These are my reactions to a presentation by the Reverend Jesse Jackson of Operation Push before a plenary session of the African Studies Association, held in Chicago on October 31, 1974.

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